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Comment

The "Green" Effect on White Collar
Sentencing: An Analysis of the Impact of the
Economy on Imprisonment Lengths of
Sentences for Federal White Collar
Defendants

On June 29, 2009, Bernard L. Madoff was sentenced to 150 years in
prison for his creation and perpetration of an unprecedented, worldwide
"Ponzi" scheme, which caused an ultimate loss to thousands of investors
totaling upwards of $65 billion.1 Although Madoff's Ponzi scheme
caused more investor losses than any one similar scheme in American
history, many were shocked by the severity of Madoff's sentence.2 As
a man in his seventies, a sentence of 150 years incarceration is well
beyond a life sentence and serves as a symbol to deter those who would
engage in similar conduct in the future.

1. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing at 43, 49, United States v. Madoff, No. 09 CR 213
(S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2009). Though the ultimate loss number has yet to be determined with
certainty, estimates range between $13 billion to $65 billion. See id. at 43.
2. Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Madoff Sentenced to 150 Years, WASH. POST, June 30, 2009,
at Al, available at http'/www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/29
/AR2009062902015.html.
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After the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,' federal
judges were bound by the United States Sentencing Guidelines
sentencing ranges.4 Since 2005, however, the Guidelines are no longer
mandatory, and federal judges currently have a large amount of
discretion when determining sentences for violators of federal law.'
Exemplary of this discretion is the wide variance in sentence severity for
white collar criminals.6 Indeed, even during the period in which the
Guidelines were mandatory, federal judges used their discretion to
depart, either upward or downward, from the Guidelines range when
addressing white collar crimes.7 As a result, white collar sentencing can
be unpredictable despite the Guidelines' arithmetic formula for
determining sentencing ranges.'
Since the fall of 2008, worldwide financial systems have been on the
brink of complete collapse. In the midst of this economic turmoil, one of
the leaders of the Wall Street brigade was discovered to have committed
the largest Ponzi scheme in American history and was sentenced to a
prison term lasting nearly twelve times his remaining life expectancy?
These parallel events raise the question of whether sentences for white
collar crimes increase in severity as the economic health of the country
decreases. First, because the Guidelines are extremely influential in a
federal judge's determination of punishment, this Article will discuss the
Guidelines' creation, modification, judicial review, and effects on white
collar sentencing. Second, because Madoff's activities and subsequent
sentencing were the inspiration behind this Article, it will consider
Madoff's sentence as an illustrative example of the application of the
Guidelines. Third and finally, the Article will compare the incarceration
length of "white collar" criminals with various measures of the health of
the United States economy at the time of their sentencing to determine
whether there is any correlation between economic turmoil and sentence
severity.

3. Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3551-3673 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (2006)).
4. Casey C. Kannenberg, Note, From Booker to Gall: The Evolution of the Reasonableness Doctrineas Applied to White.CollarCriminals and Sentencing Variances, 34 J. CORP.
L. 349, 353-54 (2008).
5. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
6. See Ellen S. Podgor, The Challenge of White Collar Sentencing, 97 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 731, 731 (2007).
7. Daniel A. Chatham, Note, Playing with Post-Booker Fire: The Dangers of Judicial
Discretion in Federal White CollarSentencing, 32 J. CORP. L. 619, 620-21 (2007).
8. See Podgor, supra note 6, at 755-56.
9. See Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, supra note 1, at 49.
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EVALUATION OF THE UNITED STATES' SENTENCING GUIDELINES

Prior to the enactment of the Guidelines, federal judges had wide
sentencing discretion because many federal criminal statutes only stated
a maximum term of imprisonment or probation."0 Thus, a federal judge
could sentence a defendant to probation or any term of imprisonment up
to the statutory maximum with virtually no appellate review. 1 As
judges exercised their discretion, punishments became increasingly
variable for defendants convicted of similar crimes.' 2 This indeterminacy resulted in reformers expressing substantial criticism of a system that
relied solely on judicial discretion to determine prison sentence.' 3 First,
indeterminacy caused unnecessary prisoner anxiety because of uncertainty regarding release dates and disparity in sentence length compared
with other, similar offenders. 4 Second, variations in sentence severity
between defendants who have committed like offenses is contrary to the
idea of equality and the rule of law."6
Indeed, sentence disparity between similarly situated defendants
inspired Marvin Frankel, a former United States District Judge in the
New York District and a Columbia University law professor, to advocate
for a more uniform, predictable sentencing system." Judge Frankel
spoke against the "wholly unchecked and sweeping" power of district
judges to determine punishment and called such a system "terrifying and
intolerable for a society that professes devotion to the rule of law." 7
Judge Frankel continued, stating that resolution would only be achieved
through a "Commission on Sentencing" that possessed the "function of
actually enacting rules ...

[and] making law."i"

Eventually, the pleas of Judge Frankel and additional legal scholars
caught the attention of Senator Edward M. Kennedy.'9 As early as
1975, Senator Kennedy began to draft legislation with the purpose of

10. Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 225 (1993).
11. Id. at 225-26.
12. Id. at 227.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 228.
17. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL
SENTENCES 5 (1973)).
18. Id. (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting FRANKEL,
supra note 17, at 122).
19. Id. at 230.
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initiating sentencing reform. 20 However, for nearly a decade, Senator
Kennedy's efforts made little progress. 2' Generally, sentencing reform
measures often hit a "brick wall" due to the polar opposite positions of
the Senate and the House of Representatives.22 Furthermore, the
House Judiciary Committee had significant concerns about dramatically
limiting the judicial discretion historically possessed by district
judges.23
The tide began to change, however, in the 1980s when Republicans
assumed control of the Senate. 24 This era greeted legislators with the
public's growing concern about crime and a president interested in
toughening existing laws and expanding anti-crime measures.25 In
1983 two bills were introduced to the Senate. The first bill was
introduced by Senator Kennedy and solely addressed sentencing
reform. The second bill, called the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1983,27 was introduced by Senator Strom Thurmond and Senator
Joseph Biden Jr.28 Although this bill addressed many areas of the
criminal code, it also contained a sentencing reform provision that was
identical to the one drafted by Senator Kennedy. 21 Initially, it appeared that both bills would follow the path of their precursors and meet
their demise in the House Judicial Committee. However, in a parliamentary coup d'etat, House supporters of the Comprehensive Crime
Control Act attached the bill to an urgent funding bill pending before the
House.3 ° On September 25, 1984, the bill passed the full House. 3'
The Senate voted to approve the bill on October 4, 1984.32 On October
12, 1984, President Reagan signed the bill into law and expressed such
enthusiasm for the tougher crime provisions that the bill became known
as "Mr. Reagan's Bill."3 3

20. Id.
21. See id. at 258.
22. Id.
23. See id. at 251.
24. See id. at 258.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 261; see Sentencing Reform Act of 1983, S. 668, 98th Cong.
27. S. 1762, 98th Cong.
28. Stith & Koh, supra note 10, at 261.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 265.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 266 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Stuart Taylor Jr.,New Crime
Act a Vast Change, Officials Assert, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1984, at Al).

WHITE COLLAR SENTENCING

2010]

1225

As part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 34 the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 3 established the United States Sentencing Commission and charged it with the task of creating sentencing
guidelines that would enhance the individualization of sentences
compared to the current law.3 ' The guidelines created by the Commission would generally be mandatory for the courts.37 Contained within
the new legislation was the directive that "the court 'shall impose a
sentence of the kind, and within the range' established by the guidelines."3' The Sentencing Reform Act provided that the Commission
would be comprised of seven persons, including three active federal
judges. 39 The federal judges would be chosen by the President from a
list of six judges created by the Judicial Conference. 40 Finally, all
members of the Commission would be appointed by the President and
needed to be approved by the Senate, each member would serve a term
of six years, and the Attorney General and the Chairman of the United
States Parole Commission would serve as nonvoting members.41
In 1986, with the members of the Sentencing Commission chosen and
approved, the Commission began proceedings to create the United States
Sentencing Guidelines.4 2 The purpose of the Guidelines was to create
sentences that would:
(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of sentencing as set forth in
section 3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code; (B) provide certainty
and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records
who have been found guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences when
warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account
in the establishment of general sentencing practices; and (C) reflect, to
the extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior
as it relates to the criminal justice process.43

34. Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, 98 Stat. 1976 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of the U.S.C.).
35. Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3551-3673 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (2006)).
36. Kannenberg, supra note 4, at 352.
37.

Id.

38. Booker, 543 U.S. at 234 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2000 & Supp. WV)).
39. Stith & Kob, supra note 10, at 279-80.
40. Id. at 279.
41. Id. at 280.
42. Introduction to UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION: UNPUBLISHED PUBLIC
HEARINGS 1986 (1988).

43.

Id.
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William W. Wilkins, Chairman of the Sentencing Commission,
emphasized that "unwarranted disparity ...is the single major problem
in our system"44 and occurs when "similar defendants commit similar
crimes,. . . and yet these defendants receive greatly disparate sentences."4" Moreover, the Commission sought to create a system which
would be understandable and would articulate to the general public why
a particular sentence was appropriate.46 On November 1, .1987, the
Guidelines became effective.47
Although federal judges immediately resented the constraints on their
judicial discretion presented by the mandatory Guidelines, the mandatory nature of the Guidelines remained in effect until 2005.48 In 2005 the
United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Booker,49 abolished
the mandatory requirements of the Guidelines. ° The Court in Booker
addressed the question of whether the mandatory Guidelines violated a
defendant's right under the Sixth Amendment of the United States
Constitution51 to a trial by a jury.52 Booker was charged with possession with intent to distribute at least fifty grams of cocaine and,
therefore, could be sentenced to between 210 to 262 months incarceration under the Guidelines. However, during the sentencing hearing, the
judge found that Booker actually was in possession of 566 grams of crack
cocaine, which mandated a sentence between 360 months and life.
Therefore, instead of sentencing Booker to twenty-one years imprisonment, the judge sentenced Booker to thirty years imprisonment. The
facts regarding
the higher amount of crack cocaine were never presented
53
to the jury.

The Court, in a two-part opinion, held that the Guidelines, as written,
violated a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights because they required a
sentencing judge, rather than a jury, to make determinations of facts
affecting the severity of a defendant's sentence.54 The Court reasoned
that although judicial fact finding is the most expedient and efficient
means of sentencing defendants, the right to a jury trial outweighs any

44. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, supra note 42, at 2-3 (statement of
William Wilkins, Chairman, U.S. Sentencing Comm.).
45. Id. at 3.
46. Id.
47. Kannenberg, supra note 4, at 353.
48. Id. at 353-54.
49. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
50. Id. at 245.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
52. Booker, 543 U.S. at 226.
53. Id. at 227.
54. Id. at 229.
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interest of expediency.55 Therefore, the Court required that any fact
other than a prior conviction, which is necessary to support an enhanced
sentence, must be either established by a guilty plea or proved to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt.5" Essentially, the Court determined that
the Sixth Amendment5 7requires juries, and not judges, to find facts
relevant to sentencing.
In the second part of the Supreme Court's opinion, Justice Breyer
explained how to remedy the Guidelines to comply with the Court's
constitutional holding.58 First, Justice Breyer noted that the basic goal
in passing the Sentencing Act was "to move the sentencing system in the
direction of increased uniformity."59 However, Justice Breyer acknowledged that this uniformity does not solely consist of identical sentences
for those convicted of violations of the same statute. ° Instead, the
uniformity sought requires consistency "between sentences and real
conduct." 1 Therefore, the Sentencing Act could not remain intact in
light of the Court's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment.6 2
The Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b),' which made the Guidelines mandatory, operated as a necessary condition of the constitutional
violation and therefore must be severed and removed.' However, 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)' operated independently and would not affect the
ultimate goal sought to be achieved by the Sentencing Commission.6 6
Even without the mandatory provision of § 3553(b), the remainder of the
Sentencing Act nonetheless requires the sentencing judge to consider the
Guidelines range for the category of offense, the types of sentences
available, the Sentencing Commission policy statements, the need to
avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, and the need to provide
restitution to the victims.67 Furthermore, this modified version of the
Sentencing Act would still require judges to "impose sentences that
reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law,
provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public,

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 238.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 245.
Id.
Id. at 253.
Id.
Id. at 254.
Id. at 258.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2006).
Booker, 543 U.S. at 259.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).
Booker, 543 U.S. at 259.
U.S.C. § 3553(a); Booker, 543 U.S. at 259-60.
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and .. . provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational

training and medical care.' ° The excision of 18 U.S.C § 3553(b)(1) also
mandated the additional removal of 18 U.S.C § 3742(e), 9 which
provided the standard of review of the sentence on appeal.70 Despite
this excision, the act still set forth an implicit "unreasonableness"
standard of review for sentences on appeal. 7' Therefore, a sentencing
judge should look first to the Guidelines, and then take into consideration the factors of 18 U.S.C § 3553(a) when determining a sentence.7 2
An appellate court reviewing the sentence will turn to the factors of 18
U.S.C § 3553(a) for determination of whether the sentence was
"reasonable" and therefore valid.73
In the cases following Booker, the Supreme Court explained the
reasonableness standard and appellate review of district court sentences.
In Rita v. United States,"4 the Court held that appellate courts may use
a presumption of reasonableness when reviewing sentences that fall
within the Guidelines range.75 In Rita the defendant was charged with
perjury as a result of statements that he made during grand jury
testimony on a collateral matter. After being convicted by a jury, the
district judge sentenced the defendant to thirty-three months imprisonment, which was the bottom of the Guidelines range. The defendant
appealed, stating that the sentence was unreasonable because it did not
take into account the defendant's history and characteristics and was
greater than necessary to satisfy the purposes of sentencing.76
The Court rejected both of the defendant's arguments, instead
resolving the circuit split in favor of the presumption of reasonableness
standard of review.77 To support the presumption of reasonableness for
sentences within the guideline range, the Court emphasized that the
Sentencing Commission "examined tens of thousands of sentences and
worked with the help of... others ... over a long period of time in an

effort to fulfill" the mandate that the sentence would be sufficient, but
not more severe than necessary.7 8 Therefore, a district judge who
imposes a sentence within the guidelines "makes a decision that is fully

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Booker, 543 U.S. at 260; accord 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2006).
Booker, 543 U.S. at 259.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 264.

73.

Id.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

551 U.S. 338 (2007).
Id. at 341, 347.
Id. at 341-46.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 349.
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consistent with the Commission's judgment in general."79 However, the
Court cautioned appellate courts about the use of a presumption of
"unreasonableness" for sentences that fall outside of the guideline
range.8 0
Furthermore, the Court considered in what manner district judges
must demonstrate that they adequately considered all relevant factors
According to 18 U.S.C
in determining a defendant's sentence."
§ 3553(c), 2 a district judge must "'state in open court the reasons for
its imposition of [a] particular sentence.'"8 3 However, a full opinion is
Instead, the sentencing judge is only
not required in every case.'
required to set forth enough information to satisfy the appellate court by
demonstrating that he or she has considered the parties' arguments and
has a reasonable basis for exercising his own discretion. 5 Even when
a judge imposes a sentence outside of the Guidelines range, he will only
be required to explain the reasoning.86 In fact, "an ordinary explanation of judicial reasons as to why the judge has, or has not, applied the
Guidelines triggers no Sixth Amendment 'jury trial' requirement."8 7
In Kimbrough v. United States,"8 the Court reinforced a district
judge's discretion when sentencing, even when the punishment is outside
of the Guidelines range.89 In Kimbrough the defendant pleaded guilty
to conspiracy to distribute crack and powder cocaine, possession with
intent to distribute more than fifty grams of crack cocaine, possession
with intent to distribute powder cocaine, and possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. To determine the appropriate
sentence, the district judge first calculated the sentence under the
Guidelines. Then the district judge increased the defendant's offense
level after finding that he testified falsely at his codefendant's trial. The
final calculation of the sentence under the Guidelines mandated
imprisonment for nineteen to twenty-five years. However, the district
court found that the Guidelines punishment would be greater than
necessary to accomplish the purpose of the Sentencing Act and, taking

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 350.
Id. at 355.
Id. at 356.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (2006).
Rita, 551 U.S. at 356 (quoting 18 U.S.C § 3553(c)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 357.
Id.
552 U.S. 85 (2007).
Id. at 90.
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into account the nature and circumstances of the offense, reduced the
sentence to fifteen years imprisonment."0
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's downward variance
from the Guidelines. 9 The Court reiterated that district courts must
first start with the Guidelines for determining a defendant's sentence;
however, because the sentencing judge has greater familiarity with the
individual case and the defendant, the judge is in a superior position to
weigh the importance of the facts and circumstances under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a).9 2 The Court expressed that punishments varying from the
Guidelines will be given the greatest respect when the sentencing judge
finds a particular case "outside the 'heartland' to which the Commission
intends individual Guidelines to apply."9 3 In contrast, sentences that
vary from the Guidelines based solely on a judge's cursory determination
that the Guidelines range fails to accurately reflect the factors of 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) may be subjected to closer review.9 4
In Gall v. United States,"8 the Court confirmed that the standard of
review for district judge sentencing decisions should be an abuse of
discretion standard.96 Defendant Gall pleaded guilty for being responsible for distributing 2500 grams of ecstasy. In the plea agreement, Gall
indicated that he withdrew from the conspiracy and had stopped using
ecstasy. The district judge deviated completely from the Guidelines
range and sentenced Gall to probation for a period of three years.9 7
The district judge explained that he determined that no imprisonment
was necessary because "'[tihe Defendant's post-offense conduct indicates
neither that he will return to criminal behavior nor that the Defendant
is a danger to society.'"9 " The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reversed, and the defendant appealed."
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and upheld the
sentence, stating that appellate review of the sentencing court's
determination of appropriate punishment should be limited to abuse of
discretion.'0 0 The Court expressly rejected an appellate rule that

90.
91.
92.

Id. at 91-93.
Id. at 111-12.
Id. at 109.

93. Id. (quoting Rita, 552 U.S. at 351).
94. Id.
95. 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
96. Id. at 59-60.
97. Id. at 42-43.
98. Id. at 44 (quoting United States v. Gall, 374 F. Supp. 2d 758, 763 (S.D. Iowa

2005)).
99. Id. at 45.
100. Id. at 59-60.
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extraordinary circumstances must be found by the sentencing judge in
order to completely deviate from the Guidelines range.'0 ' Instead, an
appellate court must give due deference to the district judge's decision
that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors merit the extent of the deviation,
even though an appellate court should take into consideration the extent
of the deviation from the Guidelines range.1 2 In light of the proximity
of the district court to the defendant and the circumstances of the case,
the Court held that it is not an appellate court's position to conduct a de
novo review as to whether the justification for the deviation from the
Guidelines range is sufficient and whether the sentence in reason-

able. 103
The Booker decision and the cases decided in its wake established the
proper procedure for a district judge when determining the appropriate
sentence for a defendant. First, a district judge should begin all
sentencing procedures by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines
range." 4 Next, the judge should give due consideration to the arguments of both of the parties. 0 5 Then, the judge should consider all of
the factors discussed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to determine whether they
support the sentence proposed by either party.' °6 The factors to be
evaluated under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) include the following:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed--(A) to accurately reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to
protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to
provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective
manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentence
and the sentencing range established for-(A) the applicable category
of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set
forth in the guidelines...
(5) any pertinent policy statements--(A) issued by the Sentencing
Commission ... and (B) ... is in effect on the date the defendant is
sentenced[;] (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities
among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

49.
51.
51-52, 59-60.
49.

at 49-50.
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and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims
similar conduct;
07
of the offense.'
If a district judge determines that a punishment outside of the Guidelines range is warranted, it must ensure that the extent of the deviation
from the Guidelines is justified by sufficiently compelling reasons. '
Any major variance must be supported by a more significant justification
than a minor variance. '0 9 In any event, a district judge must adequately explain the chosen sentence to permit meaningful appellate
review and promote the perception of fair sentencing.110
Despite the passage of the White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement
Act of 2002 (WCCPE),"' district judges have immense discretion when
There are
determining punishment for white collar criminals." 2
several possible theories explaining district judges' increased willingness
to vary from the Guidelines range when sentencing white collar
criminals. First, with the passage of the WCCPE, which dramatically
increased the maximum punishment for violators of several white collar
crimes, district judges may exercise their discretion to vary downward
from the Guidelines range in an attempt to mitigate the harshness of the
statutory maximum contained in the WCCPE. 1 3 Second, judges may
not perceive white collar crime as equally harmful as other forms of
crime. 4 Third, judges may undervalue the moral and social harms
caused by white collar offenders. ' Fourth, many white collar offenders are educated, professional individuals, and district judges may
believe that the deterrent purpose of punishment would be equally
achieved in these individuals through a lighter sentence. Although
within the Guidelines range, the sentencing of Madoff is illustrative of
a district judge's discretion under the Guidelines when formulating
punishment for white collar criminals.

107. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
108. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Pub. L. No. 107-204, tit. IX, 116 Stat. 804 (2002) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341,
1343, 1349-1350 (2006) and 29 U.S.C. § 1131 (2006)).
112. Note, Go Directly to Jail: White Collar Sentencing After the Sarbanes-OxleyAct,
122 HARv. L. REV. 1728, 1731-33 (2009).
113. See id. at 1733-34.
114. Id. at 1742.
115. Id. at 1742.

WHITE COLLAR SENTENCING

2010]

II.
A.

1233

BERNARD L. MADOFF'S CRIMES AND PUNISHMENT

Nature of Madoff's Crimes and Counsels' Requests for Punishment

On December 11, 2008, Bernard "Bernie" Madoff was arrested and
charged with a multitude of felonies, including investment advisor fraud,
mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering in perpetuation of fraud, false
statements to securities and exchange regulators, perjury, filing false
statements with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and
theft from an employee benefit plan.11 As determined by the SEC and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Madoff's fraud began in the mid1980s when he created Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities
(BLMIS) and began to solicit prospective clients to open trading
accounts. 1 7 Madoff told prospective investors that he would invest
their money in a basket comprised of between thirty and fifty common
stocks of companies listed on the Standard & Poor's 100 Index."1 He
also said that he would occasionally remove funds from the stock market
and instead invest in United States Government issued securities such
'
He promised limited risk and high returns.12 °
as treasury bills. 19
Indeed, Madoff delivered these returns and gained the trust of his
clients, which enticed additional prospective clients to invest. 12' But
Madoff had not engaged in actual trading operations for thirteen years
'
Instead, Madoff was using the funds of subseprior to his arrest. 22
quent investors to satisfy the redemption requests of other investors, to
make loans to his friends and family, and to serve as his trading
To hide his fraud, Madoff created false portfolio
commission."'

116. See Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, supra note 1, at 2, 15. This Article focuses
on Madoff s sentence for his crimes, not the methodology used to perpetrate these crimes.
Therefore, the exact details of Madofi's fraud are beyond the scope of this Article. Instead,
the general nature of Madoff's offenses will be discussed, along with a detailed analysis of
his sentence.
117. Government's Sentencing Memorandum at 2, United States v. Madoff, No. 09 CR
213 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2009).
118. Jeff Sonn, Ponzi Schemes-Picking Up the Pieces from a FallenHouse of Cards,
in SECURITIES ARBITRATION IN THE MARKET MELTDOWN ERA 443, 448 (PLI Corp. Law &
Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 1755, 2009). The Standard & Poor's 100 Index is
'a collection of the 100 largest publicly traded companies in terms of their market
capitalization." Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.; Government's Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 117, at 2-3.
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statements for his clients, which actually reflected the market activities
for the stock he was supposed to purchase for the investor. 2 4 He
created and filed false statements to the SEC.' 26 He also filed false
financial statements for his company, including balance sheets,
statements of income, statements of cash flows, and reports on internal
controls.'
Eventually, Madoff's consistently high returns raised
suspicions within the financial community.'27 In order to quell these
suspicions, Madoff voluntarily testified in 2006 before the SEC.'28
When asked how it was possible to achieve such consistently high
returns, Madoff merely replied, "Some people feel the market. Some
people
just understand how to analyze the numbers that they're looking
1 29
at."

In late 2008, as the economy crashed and individuals needed more
liquid assets, BLMIS clients began to request redemptions of their
investments.'3 ° Madoff began to witness his scheme unraveling,
despite his best efforts. For example, even though BLMIS account
statements for November 2008 indicated that his clients held a total
balance of $64.8 billion, on December 1, 2008, he was unable to meet his
client's redemption requests.'
At this point, Madoff confessed the
scheme to his sons, who subsequently contacted the authorities, and
Madoff was arrested.'3 2 On March 12,1332009, Madoff pleaded guilty to
the eleven-count criminal information.
Defense counsel for Bernie Madoff, Ira Sorkin requested a sentence of
twelve years or, in the alternative, a fifteen to twenty year prison
sentence. 3 1 In his letter to the sentencing judge, the Honorable Denny
Chin, Sorkin cited Madoff's advanced age as a reason for the reduced
sentence,' 35 stating that "Mr. Madoff is currently 71-years old and has

124. Sonn, supra note 118, at 448.
125. Government's Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 117, at 3.
126. Id.
127. Sonn, supra note 118, at 449.
128. H. DAVID KoTz, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n Office of Inspector Gen., Executive Summary
to INVESTIGATION OF FAILURE OF THE SEC TO UNCOVER BERNARD MADOFF'S PONZI SCHEME
19 (SEC Case No. OIG-509, 2009).
129. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
130. Government's Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 117, at 2-3.
131. Id.
132. Letter from Ira Sorkin, Dickstein Shapiro LLP, to Hon. Denny Chin, United States
District Judge for the Southern District of New York 2, United States v. Madoff, No. 09 CR
213 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2009).
133. Id. at 3.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 2.
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an approximate life expectancy of 13 years."136 Sorkin also asked
Judge Chin to take into account Madoff's guilty plea and his subsequent
cooperation with authorities during forfeiture and restitution proceedings. 137 Finally, Sorkin submitted the affidavit of Herbet Hoelter from
the National Center on Institutions and Alternatives, which stated that
the average prison sentence for white collar criminals who have
and who subsequently
committed crimes totaling over $400 million
138
confessed is 96.6 months, or 8.05 years.
In contrast, the United States Attorney's Office (USAO) focused on the
prevailing and massive nature of Madoff's crimes and requested that
Judge Chin issue a more severe sentence.' 39 Specifically, the USAO
emphasized that Madoff had defrauded thousands of investors, including
individuals, financial institutions, and charitable foundations. 4 ° In
addition, the USAO contended that the nature of the defendant did not
merit a lenient sentence.'
Madoff's crimes were "the product of a
series of decisions made over the course of years, and it was within his
power to stop his crimes at any point in time."142 Furthermore, Madoff
waited until he was absolutely unable to maintain his fraud to confess
and, on the days prior to his arrest, Madoff made plans to distribute any
remaining assets to his family and friends.143 The USAO contended
similar
that these factors, combined with the need to deter future
4
criminal conduct, merited a maximum prison sentence.
B.

Judge Denny Chin's Sentencing of Bernard L. Madoff

Judge Chin sentenced Madoff to the statutory maximums for all
counts contained in the criminal information. 145 The sentence total
was 150 years, plus probation and forfeiture of assets. 41 In determining the appropriate sentence, Judge Chin considered "the presentence

136. Id. at 3.
137. Id. at 2.
138. Affidavit of Herbert Hoelter at 3, United States v. Madoff, No. 09 CR 213
(S.D.N.Y. June 19, 2009). The affidavit was attached to Sorkin's letter. Letter from Ira
Sorkin to Hon. Denny Chin, supra note 132, at 3.
139. Government's Sentencing Memorandum, supra note 117, at 1.
140. Id. at 6. One of the charitable foundations that invested money with Madoffwas
the Elie Wiesel foundation, a foundation dedicated to Holocaust survivors; the foundation
invested over ten million dollars with BLMIS. Id. at 9.
141. Id. at 9.
142. Id. at 10.
143. Id. at 10-11.
144. Id. at 12.
145. See Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, supra note 1, at 4, 49.
146. Id. at 49-51.
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report, the parties' sentencing submissions, and the e-mails and letters
from victims."'4 7 Judge Chin rejected the defense's argument that the
request for a severe prison sentence was the reaction of "mob vengeance." 4 ' Instead, Judge Chin relied on the "extraordinarily evil"
nature of the crimes, the massive amount stolen, the effects and breach
of trust for the victims, and Madoff's use of the money to support a
lavish lifestyle.'4 9 Judge Chin also rejected the majority of the Madoff's mitigating factors. 5 ° Although Madoff confessed, he did so only
because "with the turn in the economy, he was not able to keep up with
the requests of customers to withdraw their funds, and it [was] apparent
that he knew he was going to be caught soon."''
Furthermore, the
significance of Madoff's confession was diminished because the court was
advised that "Madoff [was] not ...helpful" in the investigation and that
he tried to resist forfeiting the necessary assets for restitution to his
victims. '1 2 Indeed, Justice Chin noted that just days before his arrest,

Madoff made substantial loans to family members and transferred $15
million of corporate funds to his wife.153 Also of importance was the
complete absence of letters from friends or family speaking for the
character of Madoff and requesting a lighter sentence.'
Even though Judge Chin agreed with Madoff's life expectancy
analysis, Judge Chin stressed that Madoff's crimes were not comparable
in size and scope to any other white collar crime.'55 Although any
sentence over twenty years would be symbolic, Judge Chin stressed the
importance of such symbolism for future white collar offenders and the
victims of Madoff's crimes.'5 6 Judge Chin stated that the "crimes were
extraordinarily evil, and that this kind of irresponsible manipulation of
the system is not merely a bloodless financial crime that takes place just
on paper, but that it is instead, as we have heard, one that takes a
staggering human toll.""5 7 Judge Chin continued, stating that "the
symbolism is important. . . because the strongest possible message must
be sent to those who would engage in similar conduct."5 5 Finally,

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 42.
at 45, 47.
at 45.
at 45-46.
at 46.

Id.
Id. at 47.
Id.
Id.
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Judge Chin took into consideration the victims of Madoff's crimes and
that "[a] substantial sentence, the knowledge that Mr. Madoff has been
punished to the fullest extent of the law, may, in some small measure,
help the victims in their healing process."'59 Therefore, Judge Chin
determined that the statutory maximum for all counts would be an
appropriate sentence. 6 ' In doing so, he used the Guidelines to set the
parameters of the sentence 6and the statutory maximums for each count
to determine the duration.' '

Although the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, federal judges are
required to begin their sentencing determination with consideration of
the offense level set forth in the Guidelines.'62 The appropriate
Guidelines section for Madoff was section 2B1.1,' 63 which includes
larceny, embezzlement, and other forms of theft involving fraud and
deceit.'
Under this section, the base offense level is "7, if (A) the

159. Id. at 49.
160. Id.
161. Id. Specifically, count one charged Madoff with securities fraud, a violation that
carries a maximum imprisonment sentence of twenty years. Letter from Lev L. Dassin,
Acting United States Attorney, to Ira Sorkin, Dickstein Shapiro LLP 1 (Mar. 10, 2009); see
15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006). Count two charged Madoff with investment advisor fraud, which
requires a sentence of imprisonment that is not more than five years. Letter from Lev L.
Dassin to Ira Sorkin, supra, at 2; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6, 80b-17 (2006). Count three
charged Madoff with mail fraud, which carries a maximum sentence of imprisonment of
thirty years. Letter from Lev L. Dassin to Ira Sorkin, supra, at 2; see 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(2006 & Supp. I). Count four charged Madoff with wire fraud, which has a statutory
maximum of twenty years. Letter from Lev L. Dassin to Ira Sorkin, supra, at 2; see 18
U.S.C. § 1343 (2006 & Supp. I). Count five charged Madoff with international money
laundering, which carries a statutory maximum of twenty years. Letter from Lev L.
Dassin to Ira Sorkin, supra, at 2; see 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2006). Count six also charged
Madoff with international money laundering, carrying a maximum sentence of twenty
years. Letter from Lev L. Dassin to Ira Sorkin, supra, at 2-3; see 18 U.S.C. § 1956. Count
seven charged Madoff with domestic money laundering, which carries a maximum sentence
of ten years. Letter from Lev L. Dassin to Ira Sorkin, supra, at 3; see 18 U.S.C. § 1957
(2006). Count eight charged Madoff with making false statements, which carries a
maximum sentence of five years. Letter from Lev L. Dassin to Ira Sorkin, supra, at 3; see
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006). Count nine charged Madoff with perjury, which carries a
statutory maximum of five years. Letter from Lev L. Dassin to Ira Sorkin, supra,at 3; see
18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006). Count ten charged Madoff with making a false filing with the
SEC, for which he faced a statutory maximum of twenty years imprisonment. Letter from
Lev L. Dassin to Ira Sorkin, supra, at 3; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78q, 78ff (2006). Count eleven
charged Madoff with theft from an employee benefit plan, for which the statutory
maximum is five years. Letter from Lev L. Dassin to Ira Sorkin, supra, at 3-4; see 18
U.S.C. § 664 (2006).
162. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007).
163. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (2009).
164. Letter from Lev L. Dassin to Ira Sorkin, supra note 161, at 5; see U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1.

1238

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

defendant was convicted of an offense referenced to this guideline; and
(B) that offense of conviction has a statutory maximum term of
imprisonment of 20 years or more."" The base level is increased in
accordance with the loss.166 For losses of more than $400 million, the
base level is increased by thirty.167 If the crimes involved more than
250 victims, the adjusted level is then increased by six levels."M Since
a substantial portion of Madoff's crimes were committed from outside of
the United States and involved sophisticated means, the adjusted level
was increased by an additional two levels.' 69 Furthermore, because
Madoff was the leader and organizer of the criminal activity, his
adjusted offense level was increased by another four levels.17 ° Finally,
even though Judge Chin exercised some skepticism regarding Madoff's
guilty plea, he reduced Madoff's sentence by three levels because he
accepted responsibility and gave timely notice of his intention to plead
guilty.171 Therefore, Madoff's total offense level, as calculated under
the Guidelines, was fifty-two.172
After the offense level was calculated, Judge Chin next took into
account the criminal history of Madoff.'73 Since Madoff had no
criminal history prior to the current charges, he was placed in Category
L'74 According to the sentencing table, individuals with an offense
level above forty-three and a criminal history in Category I should be
sentenced to life imprisonment.175 However, because none of the
statutory crimes for which Madoff was charged carried a life sentence,
Judge Chin could not issue a life sentence. 76 Instead, in accordance
with section 5G1.2(d),177 because the sentence imposed on the highest
count was less than the total punishment, "the sentence imposed on one

165. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(a).
166. See id. § 2B1.1(b)(1).
167. Id.
168. Id. § 2B1.1(b)(2).
169. Letter from Lev L. Dassin to Ira Sorkin, supra note 161, at 5; see U.S.
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(9).
170. Letter from Lev L. Dassin to Ira Sorkin, supra note 161, at 5; see U.S.
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1(a) (2009).
171. See Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, supra note 1, at 3; Letter
Dassin to Ira Sorkin, supra note 161, at 5-6; see also U.S. SENTENCING
MANUAL § 3E1.1(a)-(b) (2009).
172. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, supra note 1, at 3.
173. See id.
174. Letter from Lev L. Dassin to Ira Sorkin, supra note 161, at 6.
175. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A1.1 (2009).
176. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, supra note 1, at 3; see U.S.
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.1 (2009).
177. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5G1.2(d) (2009).
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or more of the other counts shall run consecutively."178 Therefore, in
order to calculate the Guidelines, the statutory maximums for each
count were added together, amounting to 150 years imprisonment.1" 9
Since the Guidelines apportion punishment in terms of months, Judge
Chin converted the 150 year sentence to months." Thus, Madoff was
sentenced to 1800 months in prison.1 81 This unprecedented sentence
length correlates with a decline in the overall health of the economy and
begs the question, to what extent does the state of the economy affect
the sentence of white collar criminals? To answer this question, an
analysis of the four primary economic markers, along with sentence
lengths, must be conducted.
III.

ANALYSIS OF FOUR RELEVANT ECONOMIC MARKERS TO
DETERMINE ECONOMIC HEALTH

Economic statistics allow economists to assess and predict fluctuations
in the economy to determine both the current state of the economy and
to predict the future activities of the commercial market. 182 Of the
thirty-five statistics generally analyzed by economists, four are
These four include the
considered the major economic indicators."
real gross domestic product, the consumer price index, the unemployThe background
ment rate, and the Dow Jones Industrial Average."
and relevance of each of the economic markers are discussed in turn
below.
A.

Real Gross Domestic Product

Real gross domestic product (RGDP) is the primary measure of overall
economic and business activity." Fluctuations in RGDP are the most
important gauge of good or bad economic times.'8 6 Gross domestic
product (GDP) consists of the "market value of all final goods, services,
and structures produced in one year by labor and property located in the

178. Id.; accord Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, supra note 1, at 3.
179. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, supra note 1, at 3-4. Other punishment,
including restitution, was imposed on Madoff. See id. at 50-51.
180. Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, supra note 1, at 49.
181. Id.
182.

GARY E. CLAYTON & MARTIN GERHARD GIESBRECHT, A GUIDE TO EVERYDAY

ECONOMIC STATISTICS 1 (4th ed. 1997).
183. See id. at 2.
184.
185.

Id.
Id.

186. Id.
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United States."'87
RGDP is the GDP adjusted for inflation and,
therefore, gives a base number for comparison across different years.'
Determination of RGDP is a three step process.' 9 First, a sampling
count of the number of final goods, services, and structures is produced. 9 ' Next, a dollar value adjusted for distortions due to inflation
is assigned to the output."' Finally, these two figures are multiplied
together and summed to get a measure of the total output.' 92 Since

the numbers used in calculating RGDP already take into account
inflation, if RGDP changes by one or two percent, then any change must
be due to changes in the number of goods and services produced and not
to the change in price levels.' 93
Increases and decreases in RGDP between quarters and years indicate
whether the economy is experiencing a period of growth or a period of
shrinkage."9
For example, a recession is defined by a decline in
RGDP for two consecutive quarters. 195 RGDP does not take into
account composition of the goods, services, or structural output; nor does
it take into account nonmarket activities such as the services people
provide for themselves.' 96 Even though RGDP directly measures the
value of the output of goods, services, and structures, it also indirectly
depicts consumer activity.1 97 If the population reduces the amount of
consumption for any reason, then production of goods, services, and
structures will halt or reduce because producers will not continue to
create goods or services that no one is buying.'98 Therefore, RGDP will
decrease.
B.

Consumer Price Index
The consumer price index (CPI) is a measure of the average change in
prices for a fixed "market basket" of goods and services used by the
average consumer.'9 The market basket includes sample products for
things such as housing, food and beverages, apparel and upkeep,

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
See id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 22-23.
See id.
Id. at 89.
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transportation, medical care, and entertainment. 20 0 After the average
prices are determined for each item in the market basket, the averages
are added up and expressed as a percentage of a select base period
cost.20 1 For example, if someone wanted to compare the CPIs for 1990
and 1996, then the CPI for 1996 would be divided by the CPI for
23
This percentage would
1990.202 The result would be a percentage.
indicate that a representative item costing $1 in 1990 would cost that
percentage more in 1996. Thus, the price of the item has increased for
the consumer. 2' Generally, two overlapping measures of the CPI are
created by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2 5 First, the CPI for all
urban consumers covers about 80% of the population, and the market
basket contains those goods most likely consumed in urban environments.20 6 Second, the CPI for all urban wage earners and clerical
workers covers about 32% of the population and the market basket
contains goods most likely used by blue collar workers.20 7
The CPI can indicate inflation rates because it is essentially a
measure of the level of prices of goods.20 ' Therefore, in order to
determine inflation estimates, economists calculate the change in the
CPI from one period to another.2 9 History indicates that inflation
grows worse in the later stages of an expansion period, and the inflation
rate will slow when in periods of recession. °
C.

Unemployment Rate

The unemployment rate is determined by dividing the number of
unemployed civilians by the civilian labor force.211 Data are collected
monthly by the Bureau of Labor Statistics through a survey of 50,000
From this
households in over 2000 cities across all fifty states. 212
survey, the Bureau calculates the civilian labor force, which consists of
civilians sixteen years or older who are available to work (meaning not
confined to an institution, including mental hospitals or prisons) and

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 90.
at 91 n.4.

at 89.

at 91.

at 63.
at 60.
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who did any work at all as a paid employee during the survey week.
In contrast, an individual is considered unemployed if he or she was not
employed during the survey week, was available for work, and had made
specific efforts to find a job during the past month. 2 " Not everyone is
included in the determination of the unemployment rate.2 15 Specifically, discouraged workers-that is, workers who wanted to work, were
available for work, but who had stopped actively looking for jobs in the
past twelve months because they believed no jobs were available for
them-are not included in the labor force." 6 In addition, marginally
attached workers-workers who wanted to work, were available for
work, but had stopped looking for work for other reasons than the belief
that no work was available-are also not included in the labor force.21 7
The unemployment rate can indicate the state of the economy because
the rate fluctuates in accordance with the fluctuations in the economy.21 For example, in periods of economic expansion, the unemployment rate begins to fall.219 In contrast, in periods of recession, unemployment rates begin to rise.220 In periods of severe and dramatic
recession, unemployment rates will rise rapidly. 21 In most cases, the
unemployment rate will begin to increase shortly prior to a period of
recession.12 2 Therefore, an increase in the unemployment rate is a
leading indicator for economists to predict that a recession will
commence in the future. 2 3
D.

Dow Jones IndustrialAverage

The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) includes thirty representative stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange and serves as a
proxy for the price movements of all stocks traded on the New York
Stock Exchange. 224 The prices of stock from the thirty companies are
averaged and reported every five minutes during market hours. 225 If
the average prices of the select thirty stocks are increasing, then the

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Id. at 62.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 63 n.1.
Id. at 64-65.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 65.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 109.
See id. at 112.
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DJIA increases, and the market is presumed to be going up.2 26 In
contrast, if the average price of the select thirty stocks is decreasing,
then the DJIA goes down, and the market is presumed to be going
down. 227 Not only does the DJIA indicate the current state of the
market, but it is also regarded as an indicator of future economic
activity. 22 Generally, the average decreases before a recession begins
and increases before a period of economic expansion.229
IV.

ANALYSIS OF EACH OF THE ECONOMIC MARKERS WITH LENGTH OF
SENTENCES OF IMPRISONMENT UNDER GUIDELINES

The United States Sentencing Commission publishes annual reports
depicting the average imprisonment lengths for sentences in each
primary offense and each criminal history category.230 Because the
data contained in the reports are separated by specific offense, and not
by relevant Guidelines section, the provided lengths of imprisonment for
offenses generally considered "white collar" were averaged to determine
the average annual imprisonment lengths. Specifically, the mean
incarceration lengths for criminals who were convicted of larceny, fraud,
embezzlement, forgery, bribery, tax, and money laundering with a
criminal history in Category I were averaged. The data were limited to
those with a criminal history in Category I because this better reflects
the majority of white collar criminals.m1 The process was repeated for
all data retrieved for the survey years.232

226. Id. at 109.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 113.
229. Id.
230. See United States Sentencing Commission, Annual Reports and Statistical Sourcebooks, http'//www.ussc.gov/annrpts.htm (last visited May 26, 2010).
231. See Podgor, supra note 6, at 732.
232. These data are presented in Appendix A. This Article compares incarceration
lengths from 1995 to 2008. All data regarding the incarceration lengths were retrieved
from the United States Sentencing Commission website. The Commission provides such
data in its Annual Survey Reports. See U.S SENTENCING COMM'N, Table 14: Average
Length of Imprisonment for Offenders in Each Criminal History Category by Primary
Offense Category, in 2008 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS (2008),
available at httpJ/www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2008/Tablel4.pdf; U.S SENTENCING COMM'N,
Table 14: Average Length of Imprisonmentfor Offenders in Each CriminalHistory Category
by Primary Offense Category, in 2007 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS

(2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2007/Tablel4.pdf; U.S SENTENCING
COMMN, Table 14:Average Length of Imprisonmentfor Offenders in Each CriminalHistory
Category by Primary Offense Category, in 2006 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS (2006), available at httpJ/www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2006/Tablel4.pdf; U.S
SENTENCING COMM'N, Table 14: Average Length of Imprisonment for Offenders in Each
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As discussed in Part II of this Article, the United States Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Booker233 signified a dramatic
change in federal sentencing jurisprudence and made the Guidelines
advisory rather than mandatory.23 4 In order to compensate for this

Criminal History Category by Primary Offense Category,Fiscal Year 2005, Post-Booker,in
2005 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS (2005), available at http://www.us
sc.gov/ANNRPT/2005/tablel4_post.pdf, U.S SENTENCING COMM'N, Table 14:AverageLength
of Imprisonment for Offenders in Each Criminal History Category by Primary Offense
Category, Fiscal Year 2005, Pre-Booker, in 2005 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS, supra, available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2005/tablel4-pre.pdf; U.S
SENTENCING COMM'N, Table 14: Average Length of Imprisonment for Offenders in Each
CriminalHistory Category by PrimaryOffense Category, Fiscal Year 2004, Post-Blakely,
in 2004 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS (2004), available at http:llwww
.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2004/tablel4post.pdf; U.S SENTENCING COMM'N, Table 14: Average
Length of Imprisonment for Offenders in Each Criminal History Category by Primary
Offense Category, Fiscal Year 2004, Pre-Blakely, in 2004 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS, supra, available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2004/table
14pre.pdf; U.S SENTENCING COMM'N, Table 14: Average Length of Imprisonment for
Offenders in Each Criminal History Category by Primary Offense Category, in 2003
SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS (2003), availableat http://www.ussc.gov
/ANNRPT/2003/tablel4.pdf; U.S SENTENCING COMM'N, Table 14: Average Length of
Imprisonment for Offenders in Each Criminal History Category by Primary Offense
Category, in 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS (2002), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2002/tablel4.pdf; U.S SENTENCING COMM'N, Table 14:
Average Length of Imprisonment for Offenders in Each Criminal History Category by
Primary Offense Category, in 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
(2001), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2001/tablel4.pdf; U.S SENTENCING
COMM'N, Table 14:Average Length of Imprisonmentfor Offenders in Each CriminalHistory
Category by Primary Offense Category, in 2000 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
U.S
STATISTICS (2000), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2000/tablel4.pdf;
SENTENCING COMM'N, Table 14: Average Length of Imprisonment for Offenders in Each
CriminalHistory Category by PrimaryOffense Category,in 1999 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS (1999), available at http-J/www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/1999/table14.pdf;
U.S SENTENCING COMM'N, Table 14: Average Length of Imprisonmentfor Offenders in Each
CriminalHistory Category by Primary Offense Category, in 1998 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS (1998), available at httpJ/www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/1998/tablel4.pdf;
U.S SENTENCING COMM'N, Table 14:AverageLength of Imprisonmentfor Offenders in Each
CriminalHistory Category by Primary Offense Category, in 1997 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS (1997), availableat httpj/www.ussc.gov/annrpt/1997/tablel4.pdf;
U.S SENTENCING COMM'N, Table 14: Average Length of Imprisonment by Primary Offense
and Criminal History Categories, in 1996 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
U.S
STATISTICS (1996), available at http://www.ussc.gov/annrpt/1996/tab-14.pdf;
SENTENCING COMM'N, Table 19: Average Length of Imprisonment by PrimaryOffense and
Criminal History Categories, in 1995 ANNUAL REPORT 62, 62 (1995), available at
Data from the 2004 reports were
http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/1995/anntb95.pdf.
averaged.
233. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
234. See id. at 245.
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change in jurisprudence, two analyses were conducted to better observe
any relationship between incarceration lengths and changes in the
economy.
A. Comparison of Real Gross Domestic Product and Average Length
of Imprisonment
1. Methodology. The RGDP for the years 1995 through 2008 were
retrieved online from the United States Department of Commerce,
Bureau of Economic Analysis.235 All amounts were given in chained
2005 dollars.236 The percentage of change in the RGDP from the prior
years were calculated by subtracting the prior year's RGDP from the
observed year's RGDP and then dividing by the prior year's RGDP and
multiplying by one hundred.23 v The percentage of change from year to
year better reflects whether the economy is in a period of expansion or
regression because the less the RGDP increases, the more likely the
economy is in or entering a period of recession.23
After determining the percent change in RGDP for each year, a
regression analysis was conducted of the incarceration lengths corresponding with the percent increase in the RGDP for each year from 1995
to 2008. A separate regression analysis was conducted for years preBooker and post-Booker. The percent increase in RGDP served as the
independent variable (x-axis), and the average incarceration lengths
served as the dependent variable (y-axis). After the data were charted,
a trend line was created for the data points. The slope of the data points
was generated from the trend line. A regression analysis summary was
generated to obtain the probability-value (p-value), and a correlation
analysis
summary was generated to determine the correlation coeffi9
cient.

23

235. See Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep't Commerce, Current-Dollar and "Real"
Gross Domestic Product, http://www.bea.gov/national/xls/gdplev.xls (last visited May 26,
2010).
236. See id. "Chained" dollars account for the inflation rate. See CLAYTON &
GIESBRECHT, supra note 182, at 16. Therefore, all amounts are standardized to the value
of the 2005 dollar.
237. These data are presented in Appendix B.
238. See CLAYTON & GIESBRECHT, supra note 182, at 19.
239. The slope of a regression line depicts the type of relationship between the
variables. See MARIJA J. NORUVSIS, SPSS INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS STUDENT GUIDE 127,
184-88 (1990). For example, if variables have a direct relationship (that is, one variable
increases while the other variable increases), then the slope will be positive. See id. In
contrast, if variables have an inverse relationship (that is, if one variable increases while
the other variable decreases), the slope will be negative. See id. The p-value determines
the strength of the relationship between the variables. See THOMAS H. WONNACOT &
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2. Results. The regression analysis and trend line for the comparison of percent change in RGDP and average incarceration lengths preBooker is depicted below:

% Change in RGDP and Average Incarceration Lengths ProBooker
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The slope of the regression line is negative and therefore indicates an
inverse relationship between the percent change in RGDP and average
incarceration lengths. Specifically, as the percent of change in RGDP
decreases per year, the average incarceration lengths for white collar
crimes increase. Furthermore, the correlation coefficient for these data
points is -.48, indicating that the inverse relationship between the
percent change in RGDP and incarceration lengths for white collar
criminals is relatively weak. Finally, the p-value for the correlation
coefficient is .128 or 12.8%. Because the p-value is over 5%, these
results are not statistically significant.

RONALD J. WONNACOTT, INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS 246-48
(2d ed. 1977). Specifically, the p-value indicates the probability that any observed
relationship occurred by chance. See id. Generally, the higher the p-value, the less likely
the observed relation between the variables is indicative that the relationship would be the
same for all future variables. See id. P-values that are higher than .05 are not considered
statistically significant. See id. at 243-44. P-values that are around .05 are considered
borderline statistically significant. Finally, p-values that are less than .05 are considered
highly significant. See id. at 244-45.
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The regression analysis and trend line for the comparison of percent
change in RGDP and average incarceration lengths post-Booker is
depicted below:
%Change in RGDP and Average Incarceration Lengths Post-Booker
23.5 ,
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Again, the slope of the regression line is negative, which indicates an
inverse relationship between percent change in RGDP and average
incarceration lengths. This means that as the percent change in RGDP
decreases, the average incarceration lengths increase. The correlation
coefficient between these data points is -.92, which indicates that the
inverse relationship is strong. However, the p-value is .07 or 7%, which
indicates that the relationship is not statistically significant. This is
most likely due to the lower number of data points rather than a lack of
relationship. Thus, although not statistically significant, there is a
visible trend that with the passage of time and the collection of
additional data, may prove to be statistically significant.
B. Comparison of Consumer Price Index and Average Length of
Imprisonment
1. Methodology. The website for the Bureau of Labor Statistics
provided the yearly averages for the urban CPI for the years 1995 to
2008 and the annual percent changes. 2 ° The percent change between
each year was calculated by subtracting the previous year from the
current year, then dividing by the previous year and multiplying by one
hundred.2 4 ' Just as with RGDP, the percent change better reflects any

240.

See Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Consumer Price Index: All

Urban Consumers, ftp://iftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt (last visited May 26,
2010).
241. These data are presented in Appendix C.
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increase or decrease in inflation, and thus, any increase or decrease in
the value of money.2" 2
The percent change in CPI served as the independent variable and
was graphed on the x-axis. The average incarceration length served as
the dependent variable and was graphed on the y-axis. A regression line
was generated to show any relationship between the data sets. The
slope from the regression line indicates whether the relationship
between the variables is positive or negative. Finally, a regression
analysis and a correlation summary were generated to determine the
correlation coefficient and probability value of the correlation coefficient.
2. Results. The regression analysis, correlation analysis, and trend
line for the comparison of percent change in CPI and average yearly
incarceration length pre-Booker is depicted below:

% Change in CPI and Average Incarceration Lengths Pre-Booker
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The slope of the regression line is negative, which indicates that any
relationship between the percent change in CPI and average incarceration length is an inverse relationship. Specifically, as there is a greater
percent change in CPI between years, the incarceration length decreases.
However, the p-value of the correlation coefficient is .73, which means
that there is no statistically significant relationship between the data
points because there is a greater than a 5% chance that any relationship

242. If the inflation rate is high, then the value, or spending power, of one dollar is less
than if the inflation rate was low. CLAYTON & GIESBRECHT, supra note 182, at 91 n.4. The

CPI is set at a base of 100 for 1982 to 1984. See id.; Bureau of Labor Statistics, supranote
240. Thus, all numbers and percent changes are calculated with respect to this 100 base
in 1984.
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is due to a coincidence. Finally, the correlation coefficient is -. 11, which
indicates an inverse, or negative relationship.
The regression analysis, correlation analysis, and trend line for the
comparison of percent change in CPI and average yearly incarceration
length post-Booker is depicted below:
% Change in CPI and Average Incarceration Lengths PostBooker
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The slope of the regression line is positive, which indicates that as the
percent change in CPI increases, the average incarceration length
increases. The correlation coefficient is .18, which indicates that the
relationship is positive, but it is not very strong. Finally, the p-value is
very high at .81, or 81%. Although the very high p-value may be due to
the small amount of data points, it may also be due to the fact that there
is no relationship between CPI and average incarceration length. The
pre-Booker data show a negative relationship, which is apparently at
odds with the positive relationship shown by the post-Booker data.
Clarity as to the existence and nature of any relationship will come with
additional data.
C. Comparison of Unemployment Rate and Average Length of
Imprisonment
1. Methodology. The Bureau of Labor Statistics provided the
annual average unemployment rate data for the years 1995 to 2008.243
No additional calculations were conducted to prepare the annual average
unemployment rate for analysis.

243. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Where Can I Find the Unemployment Rate for Previous Years?, http://www.bls.gov/cps/prev-yrs.htm (last visited May 26,
2010). These data are presented in Appendix D.
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A regression analysis of the annual average unemployment rates and
the average incarceration lengths for white collar criminals was
conducted for both pre-Booker and post-Booker data. The annual
average unemployment rate served as the independent variable (x-axis).
The average length of incarceration served as the dependent variable (yaxis). The variables were charted, and a regression line was created to
determine the slope of the lines for each graph. A correlation analysis
and summary was created to determine the correlation coefficient and
the strength of any relationship between the variables. Finally, a
regression summary was generated to reveal the P-value for the
correlation coefficient for both sets of data.
2. Results. The regression analysis, correlation analysis, and trend
line for the comparison of annual average of unemployment rate and
average incarceration length pre-Booker is depicted below:
Unemployment Rate and Average Incarceration Lengths Pre-Booker
25
2y
20-

= 0.9244x + 13.078
.~

-

. Senesl
oo

,

-Lnear

10-

(Sedesl)

5
0

3
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Unemployment

The slope of the regression line is positive, which indicates a direct
relationship between the unemployment rate and the average length of
incarceration for white collar criminals. Specifically, as unemployment
rates increase, the average length of incarceration for white collar
criminals increases. Furthermore, the correlation coefficient is .559,
suggesting that there is a positive correlation, and the relationship is
strong. Finally, the probability-value of the correlation coefficient is .07
or 7%. This probability-value means that the relationship is almost
statistically significant. Thus, even though there is not a statistically
significant relationship, analysis of the data does show a trend that as
unemployment rates increased, the severity of sentencing pre-Booker
increased.
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The regression analysis, correlation analysis, and trend line for the
comparison of annual average of unemployment rate and average
incarceration length post-Booker is depicted below:
Unemployment Rate and Average Incarceration Rates Post-Booker
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The slope of the regression line is positive, which indicates that there
is a positive relationship between the unemployment rate and sentences
for white collar crimes. The correlation coefficient is .41, which confirms
that there is a positive relationship, but that the relationship is not very
strong. Furthermore, the probability-value is .58, or 58%, which
indicates that any relationship present is not statistically significant.
Again, this could be due to the small amount of data points and the
small range of variation.
D. Comparison of Dow Jones IndustrialAverage and Average
Imprisonment Length
1. Methodology. Yahoo! Finance provided the adjusted close rates
of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) for the years 1995 through
2008.244 Since the adjusted close rates were provided on a monthly
basis, the average of all twelve months for each year was calculated in
order to determine annual percent change. The annual percent change
was calculated by subtracting the prior year's average DJIA from the
observed year's average DJIA and then dividing by the prior year's DJIA
and multiplying by one hundred.245
244. See Yahoo! Finance, Dow Jones Industrial Average, httpJ/finance.yahoo.com/q/
hp?s=%5EDJI (last visited May 26, 2010).
245. These data are presented in Appendix E.
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A regression analysis of the annual percent change of the DJIA and
the incarceration lengths for white collar criminals was conducted to
determine the presence of any relationship. The percent change for the
DJIA served as the independent variable (x-axis), and the average
incarceration lengths served as the dependent variable (y-axis). The
variables were charted, and a regression line was created to determine
the slope. A regression summary was generated, which revealed the pvalue of the correlation coefficient. Finally, a correlation analysis and
summary was generated to determine the correlation coefficient.
2. Results. The regression analysis and trend line for the comparison of percent change of the DJIA and average incarceration lengths for
white collar criminals pre-Booker is depicted below:

% Change in DJIA and Average Incarceration Lengths Pre-Booker
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The slope of the regression line is negative, which indicates that there
is an inverse relationship between the percent change in the annual
DJIA and the average incarceration lengths for white collar criminals.
Therefore, as the percent change in the annual DJIA decreases, the
average incarceration length for white collar criminals increases.
Furthermore, the correlation coefficient is -.51, which confirms that there
is an inverse relationship and that the relationship is moderately strong.
The probability-value for the correlation coefficient is .10 or 10%, which
indicates that, although the results are not statistically significant, there
appears to be an observable trend.
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The regression analysis and trend line for the comparison of annual
average of the DJIA and average incarceration lengths for white collar
criminals post-Booker is depicted below:
% Change inDJIA and Average Incarceration Lengths
Post-Booker
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The slope of the regression line is negative, which indicates that there
is an inverse relationship between the percent change in the DJIA and
the average incarceration lengths for white collar criminals. However,
the correlation coefficient is -.38, which confirms an inverse relationship,
but indicates that the relationship is not very strong. Finally, the pvalue is .61 or 61%, which means that the relationship is not statistically
significant. However, this might be due to the small amount of data
available, and additional research is needed to more accurately observe
any relationships.
V.

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS

None of the variables analyzed in the previous section revealed a
statistically significant relationship. But for the comparisons of RGDP,
unemployment, and DJIA, there were obvious trends. With regard to
the analysis of sentences given after the Court's decision in United
States v. Booker,246 the limited data available most likely affected the
reliability of the results. However, the comparisons of pre-Booker
sentences, unemployment rates, and percent change in DJIA both
yielded correlation coefficients that indicate the presence of an observable trend. 247 These relationships indicate that as the economy

246.
247.

543 U.S. 220 (2005).
See supra Part 1V.C and Part IV.D.
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worsens, the length of imprisonment for white collar crimes increases.
This trend may continue as district courts continue to sentence white
collar criminals post-Booker. However, at this point, the data included
in the above analysis is too limited, and additional research must be
conducted in the future to enable firm concllusions to be drawn. Also,
the comparison between RGDP and post-Booker sentences indicated the
presence of a relationship. Specifically, as the percent change in RGDP
decreased, the length of incarceration periods for white collar criminals
increased. This, again, suggests that a change in the economy may
affect judicial discretion in white collar sentencing.
Often, a judge's political or ideological preferences can affect the
severity of sentences under the Guidelines. 4 ' For example, Democratic judges generally give less severe punishments under the Guidelines
than Republican judges.249 If a judge, whether consciously or unconsciously, allows his or her political affiliations and ideologies to affect
discretion under the Guidelines, then it is reasonable to assume that a
judge would also allow the nation's economic status to affect the
sentencing of white collar criminals. This is particularly true given that,
by definition, white collar criminals' actions directly affect the finances
of their victims. A victim's life savings or investments may have been
completely wiped out by the white collar criminal just when the economy
is experiencing a period of recession and the victim needs the money the
most. Of the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553,250 a judge is most
likely to account for the state of the economy through the need for the
sentence to accurately reflect the seriousness of the crime, the need for
the sentence to afford adequate deterrence to similar criminal conduct,
and the need to protect the public from further crimes. Since the Court's
decision in Booker, reliance on these factors permits a judge to exercise
personal discretion. When the victim of a white collar criminal has
experienced this double dosage of economic hardship through no fault of
their own, a district judge may deem the crime more severe and may see
more of a dire need to protect the public and deter future criminals.
Also, the existence of a recession may motivate white collar criminals
to commit more egregious crimes in an effort to maintain investor
confidence or hide already existing frauds. For example, "cookie jar
fraud," a common form of accounting fraud, is likely more prevalent in

248. See Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing
Guidelines: JudicialPolitics,EmpiricalEvidence, and Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 715, 725
(2008).
249. Id.
250. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006).
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times of recession.251 A "cookie jar fraud" occurs when a corporate
accountant sets aside surplus revenue from periods in which the
company is doing well in mislabeled accounts that do not generally
appear on a corporation's financial records.252 Then, when the corporation enters a period of decline, as when the economy enters a period of
recession, the previously set aside corporate funds are shifted to
accounts, that indicate the corporation is still doing well. 253 The
motivation behind this sort of fraudulent activity is most likely panic
and fear that investors will withdraw their money if the corporation
looks unhealthy. Such creative accounting practices defraud investors
and prevent victims from making the wisest and safest choice for their
money. Thus, when the economy enters a period of recession, fear,
greed, and panic motivate criminal activities that would not have
occurred and are more severe than those occurring during a period of
economic expansion.
Finally, incarceration periods may be longer for white collar criminals
sentenced during periods of recession because corporate crimes may be
more frequently discovered during such periods. For example, Bernie
Madoff's Ponzi scheme was uncovered largely because his investors
needed to liquidate assets after economy crashed in 2008.2" Only
when he was asked to return fraudulent investments was he forced to
admit to his criminal activity.255 Thus, when the economy places
financial constraints on corporations and individual investors, and these
investors seek to liquidate assets to compensate for these constraints,
fraudulent financial activity is more likely to be discovered. This
additional likelihood could affect the average severity of punishment for
white collar crimes because, faced with an influx of similar criminals,
federal judges may deem more severe punishments necessary to deter
future crimes and to protect the public.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The United States Sentencing Guidelines were created with the goal
of making punishments for federal crimes more uniform and predictable.256 However, after the decision in United States v. Booker,25 7

251. See Richard G. Frohling, Fraud and Other Issues on the Horizon, in BASICS OF
ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS 2009, at 481,484 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook
Series No. 1752, 2009).
252. Id.
253. See id.
254. See Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, supra note 1, at 45.
255. Id.

256.

Stith & Koh, supra note 10, at 225.
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federal judges now have more discretion when determining punishments
for particular crimes.25 Although more data are needed to reach a
statistically significant conclusion, this Article has shown the overall
health of the economy may correlate with the lengths of sentences of
incarceration for white collar criminals. Whether this correlation is
manifested because of judges' beliefs that financial crimes are more
egregious in times when individuals are placed under additional
constraints or whether the correlation is a result of more financial
crimes being committed and uncovered has yet to be determined.
JESSICA P. MORGAN

257.
258.

543 U.S. 220 (2005).
Chatham, supra note 7, at 619.
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Average Yearly Imprisonment Lengths
Pre-Booker

Year

Average (Months)

1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

16.5
17.8
17.4
16.2
17.3
17.4
18.3
19.1
19.5
19.1
17.1

Post-Booker

Year

Average (Months)

2005
2006
2007
2008

20.5
21.3
22.1
22.7
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Appendix B
Percent Change in Yearly Gross Domestic Product

Year

Yearly RGDP

1995

1994
1995
1995
1996
1996
1997
1997
1998
1998
1999
1999
2000
2000
2001
2001
2002
2002
2003
2003
2004
2004
2005
2005
2006
2006
2007
2007
2008

1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

=
=
=
=

8870.7
9093.7
9093.7
9433.9
= 9433.9
= 9854.3
= 9854.3
= 10,283.5
= 10,283.5
= 10,779.8
= 10,779.8
= 11,226.0
= 11,226.0
= 11,347.2
= 11,347.2
= 11,553.0
= 11,553.0
= 11,840.7
= 11,840.7
= 12,263.8
= 12,263.8
= 12,638.4
= 12,638.4
= 12,976.2
= 12,976.2
= 13,254.1
= 13,254.1
= 13,312.2

Percent Change
2.5
3.7
4.5
4.4
4.8
4.1
1.1
1.8
2.5
3.6
3.1
2.7
2.1
0.4
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Appendix C
Percent Change in Yearly Consumer Price Index

Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

Yearly CPI

Percent Change

=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=
=

2.8

1994
1995
1995
1996
1996
1997
1997
1998
1998
1999
1999
2000
2000
2001
2001
2002
2002
2003
2003
2004
2004
2005
2005
2006
2006
2007
2007
2008

148.20
152.40
152.40
156.90
156.90
160.50
160.50
163.00
163.00
166.60
166.60
172.20
172.20
177.10
177.10
179.88
179.88
183.96
183.96
188.90
188.90
195.30
195.30
201.60
201.60
207.34
207.34
215.30

3.0
2.3
1.6
2.2
3.4
2.8
1.6
2.3
2.7
3.4
3.2
2.8
3.8

MERCER LAW REVIEW

1260

[Vol. 61

Appendix D
Unemployment Rate
Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

Average Unemployment Rate
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Appendix E
Percent Change in Dow Jones Industrial Average

Year
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

Average Yearly DJIA
1994
1995
1995
1996
1996
1997
1997
1998
1998
1999
1999
2000
2000
2001
2001
2002
2002
2003
2003
2004
2004
2005
2005
2006
2006
2007
2007
2008

= 3,792
= 4,534
= 4,534
= 5,780
= 5,780
= 7,438
= 7,438
= 8,610
= 8,610
= 10,475
= 10,475
= 10,688
= 10,688
= 10,140
= 10,140
= 9,181
= 9,181
= 9,018
= 9,018
= 10,326
= 10,326
= 10,529
= 10,529
= 11,472
= 11,472
= 13,198
= 13,198
= 11,224

Percent Change
19.5
27.5
28.7
15.8
21.7
2.0
-5.1
-9.5
-1.8
14.5
2.0
9.0
15.0
-15.0

